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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge. 
 
The majority opinion which follows was in final form 
before the Supreme Court of the United States heard 
argument in the appeal of Carhart v. Stenberg , 192 F.3d 
1142 (8th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court has now issued 
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its opinion in that case, finding Nebraska's "partial birth 
abortion" statute -- a statute nearly identical to the one 
before this Court -- unconstitutional. See Stenberg v. 
Carhart, ___ U.S. ___, 2000 WL 825889 (U.S. June 28, 
2000). Because nothing in that opinion is at odds with this 
Court's opinion; because, in many respects, that opinion 
confirms and supports this Court's conclusions and, in 
other respects, goes both further than and not as far as, 
this opinion; and, because we see no reason for further 
delay, we issue this opinion without change. 
 
Defendant-Intervenor, the New Jersey State Legislature 
(the "Legislature"), appeals the decision of the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey holding the 
New Jersey Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997 (the 
"Act") unconstitutional and permanently enjoining 
enforcement of the Act. In a comprehensive opinion, the 
District Court found the Act unconstitutional because it: (1) 
is void for vagueness; and (2) places an undue burden on 
a woman's constitutional right to obtain an abortion. See 
Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d 




On December 15, 1997, the New Jersey State Legislature, 
overriding the governor's veto, joined what is now a 
majority of states in enacting a law banning "partial-birth 
abortions."1 Since the first such statute was passed in 
Ohio, statutes similar to the Act have been wending their 
way through the judicial system with various courts 
attempting to ascertain the constitutionality of each statute 
within the context of over twenty-five years of abortion 
rights jurisprudence. 
 
While the vast majority of courts have enjoined the 
enforcement of these statutes because they are 
unconstitutionally vague and impose an undue burden on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See App. at 1846 (listing state statutes). The Congress of the United 
States also passed federal "partial birth abortion" bans in 1995 and 
1997. Both were vetoed by the President. 
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women who seek to have an abortion, it is the statute 
before us on which we must focus our attention. As we do 
so, we are fully aware that this dispute is framed by deeply 
held convictions concerning abortion by men and women of 
good will, convictions which we recognize and respect. On 
the one side of the abortion issue, and the emotionally 
charged public debate that issue engenders, are those who 
believe that all abortion procedures are equally 
objectionable, not merely the "partial birth abortion" 
procedure at issue in this case, a position largely 
foreclosed, as a matter of law, by Roe and Casey. On the 
other side of the issue and the debate are those who fear 
any encroachment on a woman's right to seek an abortion. 
It is not for us to decide who is right and who is wrong as 
a matter of conviction or philosophy. Rather, after carefully 
analyzing the statute before us, we must decide whether 
that statute passes constitutional muster. 
 
A. Procedural History 
 
The day the Act was to become effective, Planned 
Parenthood of Central New Jersey ("Planned Parenthood") 
and several physicians (collectively as "plaintiffs"), filed suit 
on their own behalf and on behalf of their patients against 
the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, the New 
Jersey Board of Medical Examiners, and the Commissioner 
of the Department of Health and Senior Services of New 
Jersey ("HSS") (collectively as "defendants"). Plaintiffs 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. SS 1983 and 1988 and 28 U.S.C. SS 2201 and 2202 
with one goal in mind: to prevent the Act from taking effect. 
The Attorney General, the New Jersey Board of Medical 
Examiners and the Commissioner of the HSS all declined to 
defend the Act. Accordingly, the Legislature sought leave to 
intervene for that purpose, and leave was granted. See 
Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Verniero, No. 97-6170, 
slip. op. at 1 (D.N.J. Dec. 24, 1997) (Order). On December 
16, 1997, the District Court entered a Temporary 
Restraining Order preventing enforcement of the Act 
pending a hearing on the application for an injunction. 
After a four-day hearing, at which the three individual 
plaintiff physicians and four defense witnesses testified, the 
District Court permanently enjoined enforcement of the Act, 
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and the Legislature appealed. We exercise appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
B. The Act 
 
New Jersey's partial-birth abortion statute prohibits "an 
abortion in which the person performing the abortion 
partially vaginally delivers a living human fetus before 
killing the fetus and completing the delivery." N.J.S.A. 
S 2A:65A-6(e). The Act purports to define the phrase 
"vaginally delivers a living human fetus before killing the 
fetus" to mean "deliberately and intentionally delivering into 
the vagina a living fetus, or a substantial portion thereof, 
for the purpose of performing a procedure the physician or 
other health care professional knows will kill the fetus, and 
the subsequent killing of the human fetus." N.J.S.A. 
S 2A:65A-6(f). The Act provides a single exception whereby 
this otherwise banned procedure may be used: namely, 
when the procedure "is necessary to save the life of the 
mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, 
illness or injury." N.J.S.A. S 2A:65A-6(b). 
 
Unlike almost all of the "partial-birth abortion" statutes 
enacted throughout the country, the Act is civil, not 
criminal. The penalties for violations of the Act are, 
nonetheless, severe. Under the Act, those who perform 
"partial-birth abortions" are subject to immediate 
professional license revocation and a $25,000 fine for each 
abortion performed. See N.J.S.A. S 2A:65A-6(c). An 
ambulatory health care facility at which such a banned 
procedure takes place is also subject to the immediate 
revocation of its license. See N.J.S.A.S 2A:65A-6(d). A 
woman upon whom a "partial-birth abortion" is performed, 
however, is not subject to any penalties. See Senate 
Women's Issues, Children and Family Services Committee 




Because the District Court's findings of fact are not 
clearly erroneous, see Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. 
Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 481 (3d Cir. 1999), we will draw 
heavily from its opinion in setting forth those facts below. 
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1. Abortion Procedures 
 
The term "partial-birth abortion" does not exist in 
medical parlance and, thus, scrutiny of the Act depends 
largely on determining precisely what abortion procedure or 
procedures the Act prohibits and whether this prohibition 
creates an undue burden on a woman's right to an 
abortion. It is, therefore, necessary to describe and examine 
abortion procedures generally recognized by the medical 
community, a description and examination that will, of 
necessity, be somewhat graphic. Relying upon expert 
testimony, the District Court detailed several abortion 
procedures: (1) suction curettage; (2) dilation and 
evacuation ("D&E"); (3) intact dilation and extraction 
("D&X"); (4) induction and installation; (5) hysterotomy; and 
(6) hysterectomy.2 
 
Ninety percent of all abortions are performed during the 
first trimester of pregnancy. Suction curettage, also known 
as vacuum aspiration, is the standard procedure forfirst 
trimester abortions. During this procedure, a physician 
mechanically dilates the cervix and then inserts a cannula 
-- a hollow tube with blunt openings -- into the uterus. 
The cannula is attached to a vacuuming device and suction 
is used to remove the uterine contents, including the 
amniotic fluid, the fetus and the placenta. Afterwards, the 
physician may scrape the uterine walls to ensure that the 
uterus is fully evacuated. The fetus may be intact or 
disarticulated, meaning dismembered, when it is suctioned 
out of the uterus and through the cervix and vaginal canal. 
In addition, at times, part of the intact fetus may be in the 
vagina and part in the uterus, or a disarticulated part of 
the fetus may be in the vagina while the remainder is in the 




2. These descriptions of the procedures are consistent with the 
description utilized by the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists ("ACOG"), a non-profit professional association of 
physicians specializing in women's health care and representing 
approximately 95% of all board-certified obstetricians and gynecologists 
practicing in the United States. ACOG is appearing as amicus curiae in 
this action. 
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The dilation and evacuation ("D&E") procedure is 
performed during the second trimester, between thirteen 
and twenty weeks measured from the first day of the 
woman's last menstrual period ("lmp"). Eighty to ninety 
percent of the abortions performed after the first trimester 
are D&E procedures. During the D&E, the physician dilates 
the cervix either mechanically or by using osmotic dilators 
which are inserted into the cervical canal twelve to thirty 
hours prior to the procedure. Once the cervix is sufficiently 
dilated, the physician uses light suction to rupture the 
amniotic sac. Then, largely without the benefit of seeing the 
contents of the uterus, the physician inserts forceps into 
the uterus, grasps hold of a part of the fetus and extricates 
it from the woman's body. This process is repeated until the 
entire fetus has been removed. The physician then uses 
suction to remove the placenta. 
 
During this procedure, the fetus may be removed from 
the uterus and pulled through the cervix and the vaginal 
canal either intact or disarticulated. The amount of 
disarticulation depends upon the width of the dilated cervix 
as well as the gestational stage of the fetus because the 
fetus is more prone to disarticulate at earlier stages of the 
pregnancy. As with the suction curettage procedure, the 
D&E may result in a situation in which part of an intact 
fetus is in the vagina and part in the uterus or a 
disarticulated part of the fetus is in the vagina while the 
remainder of the fetus is in the uterus. In either 
circumstance, the fetus may still have a heartbeat. 
 
After fourteen weeks lmp, the physician may use a 
similar procedure in which he or she grasps the fetus by its 
feet or legs and attempts to draw the fetus intact through 
the cervix and into the vagina. The fetal head may become 
stuck in the internal cervical os requiring the physician to 
apply suction to dislodge the head. If the suction does not 
work, the physician must either disarticulate the fetal head 
and deliver it apart from the body or collapse the head in 
order to deliver the fetus intact. The fetus may still have a 
heartbeat while its body is in the vagina and the head 
lodged in the cervix. This procedure is termed an"intact 
dilation and extraction" ("D&X") by the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists ("ACOG"). Although the 
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D&X has not been the subject of clinical trials or peer 
reviewed studies, the District Court concluded that the 
procedure may pose a lesser risk of cervical laceration and 
uterine perforation because the procedure requires less 
instrumentation than the D&E and fewer entries into the 
uterus. In addition, the D&X generally results in an intact 
fetus which is often desirable for diagnostic purposes. 
 
During the second trimester, but generally not before 
sixteen weeks lmp, induction abortions account for the 
majority of abortions performed which are not D&E 
abortions. During an induction procedure, the physician 
dilates the cervix twelve to twenty-four hours before 
medically inducing labor. Installation abortions, a subset of 
inductions, involve the injection of a lethal substance, such 
as sodium chloride or concentrated urea, into the uterus 
either through the abdomen or through the cervix to cause 
uterine contractions. Labor can last anywhere from ten to 
thirty hours, resulting in the delivery of an intact fetus. 
During an induction abortion, the fetus may die before 
delivery. For example, the fetus may die in the uterus by 
the injection of a lethal substance or by uterine 
contractions. In addition, the fetus may expire during 
delivery if, for example, the fetus becomes entangled in the 
umbilical cord, or the fetal head becomes lodged in the 
internal cervical os, requiring the physician to disarticulate 
the head and deliver it separate from the body or deflate 
the head in order to remove the intact fetus. Circumstances 
requiring an expeditious delivery, such as maternal 
hemorrhaging, may result in disarticulation. In addition, 
the physician may need to sever the umbilical cord if the 
fetus becomes entangled in it during delivery. In any of 
these circumstances, fetal death may occur while the fetus 
is partially in the uterus and partially in the vagina. 
 
The two remaining methods of abortion are hysterotomy 
and hysterectomy, procedures which are very rarely 
performed for purposes of aborting a fetus. A hysterotomy 
is a pre-term cesarean section in which the fetus is 
delivered through an incision in the abdomen. A 
hysterectomy is the complete removal of the uterus. Both 
procedures carry a higher risk of maternal death than other 
methods of abortions due to the possibility of hemorrhage. 
The hysterectomy, of course, renders the woman sterile. 
 




Planned Parenthood, an ambulatory health care facility 
licensed pursuant to N.J.A.C. S 8:43A-1.3, provides vacuum 
aspiration abortions up to fourteen weeks lmp. Plaintiffs 
Gerson Weiss, M.D., David Wallace, M.D., and Herbert 
Holmes, M.D., are licensed to practice medicine in the State 
of New Jersey. Dr. Weiss, a professor in and Chairman and 
Chief of Service of the Department of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of 
New Jersey-New Jersey Medical School ("UMDNJ"), oversees 
the provision of all obstetrical and gynecological care at the 
hospital, including abortions up through eighteen weeks 
lmp. He established a training program and teaches 
residents the full range of obstetric and gynecological care, 
including abortions. He is also Director of the Center for 
Reproductive Medicine, which is affiliated with Hackensack 
Hospital. Dr. Weiss is board-certified in obstetrics and 
gynecology, and has a subspecialty board-certification in 
reproductive endocrinology. He has performed abortions 
since 1968 and has personally performed between 500 and 
1000 abortions using the vacuum aspiration and D&E 
methods. He has also performed hysterotomy abortions. 
 
Dr. Wallace is the President of the Medical Staff at 
Monmouth Medical Center, which is affiliated with the St. 
Barnabas Health Care System in Long Branch, New Jersey. 
He is Chairman of the Department of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology and Director of the residency program. Dr. 
Wallace is board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology, and 
is eligible for certification in maternal-fetal medicine. Since 
1980, Dr. Wallace has performed between 1,500 and 2,000 
abortions and currently performs about fifty abortions 
annually. He performs abortions through twenty-three 
weeks lmp, supervises abortions, and teaches abortion 
procedures. He utilizes both the vacuum aspiration and the 
D&E methods. 
 
Dr. Holmes is a clinical associate professor of obstetrics 
and gynecology at UMDNJ, where he is the primary 
physician performing abortions. He is also an attending 
surgeon at Newark Beth Israel Hospital with primary 
responsibility for abortions. Annually, he performs 400 to 
500 first trimester vacuum aspiration abortions and 200 to 
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300 second trimester D&E abortions up through eighteen 
weeks lmp. He performs D&E abortions after eighteen 
weeks lmp where there is a demonstrable fetal abnormality. 
Dr. Holmes was previously affiliated with United Hospitals 
in Newark, New Jersey, where he performed induction and 
installation abortions through twenty weeks lmp, and 
through twenty-four weeks lmp in the case of fetal 
abnormality or risk to the mother's health. 
 
Each physician was qualified to testify as an expert in 
obstetrics and gynecology, including abortion procedures, 




The order of the District Court holding the Act 
unconstitutional and granting a permanent injunction is 
the focus of the parties' attention, and ours. We review that 
order under an abuse of discretion standard. See American 
Civil Liberties Union of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of 
Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1476 (3d Cir. 1996). "An abuse of 
discretion exists where the district court's decision rests 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant 
conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to 
fact." Id. (citation omitted). In addition to the 
constitutionality of the Act, however, several other issues -- 
standing, ripeness, and abstention -- have been raised by 
the Legislature. While recognizing that generally such 
issues are discussed sooner rather than later, an analysis 
of these issues is directly informed by the scope of the Act. 
See Audio Tape of Oral Argument before Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit (Nov. 19, 1999) (on file with Court) 
(statement by the attorney for the Legislature that the 
"central issue in this case" is the scope of the Act and 
"every issue in this case turns on the answer to that 
question: abstention, ripeness, vagueness, undue burden, 
everything else . . ."). We, therefore, will defer our 
consideration of these issues until after we have considered 
the Act's constitutionality -- or lack thereof. 3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We reject out of hand two additional issues summarily raised by the 
Legislature. The Legislature asserts that the District Court abused its 
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A. Constitutionality of Act 
 
1. The Act is Void for Vagueness 
 
The District Court found the Act unconstitutionally vague 
because it failed to define with any certainty the conduct 
that is proscribed. The Legislature contends that the 
District Court erred in so finding because although some 
terms may be ambiguous, the Court confused the concepts 
of ambiguity and vagueness and, in any event, should have 
narrowed the scope of the Act instead of striking down the 
Act in its entirety. Conceding that D&E, suction curettage 
and induction abortions are constitutionally protected, the 
Legislature argues that, if construed narrowly, the Act 
simply bans the D&X procedure and not conventional 
methods of abortion. The Legislature also points to the 
intent element contained within the Act which purportedly 
"clearly" restricts its scope. The District Court found that 
the Act was not readily susceptible to a narrowing 
interpretation and that the intent element does not cure the 
vagueness concerns. We agree. 
 
The Supreme Court has been explicit: 
 
       It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment 
       is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly 
       defined. Vague laws offend several important values. 
       First, because we assume that man is free to steer 
       between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that 
       laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
discretion in: (1) excluding materials, such as newspaper articles, that 
illustrate the public debate surrounding partial birth abortion, as well 
as 
testimony of witnesses that the fetus is a human being and able to 
experience pain; and (2) refusing to completely correct the transcripts of 
the hearings. After examining the record, we find no abuse of discretion 
in disallowing the materials and testimony because, among other 
reasons, they were not relevant to the issue before the Court, i.e. the 
constitutionality of the Act. As for the transcripts, the District Court 
did 
grant in part the Legislature's motion to amend the transcripts to 
adequately reflect significant deviations but refused to order all of the 
Legislature's proposed corrections, some of which included replacing 
"gonna" with "going to." App. at 1250. We find no error, much less an 
abuse of discretion. 
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       reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so 
       that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the 
       innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if 
       arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be 
       prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for 
       those who apply them. 
 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) 
(footnotes omitted). The level of specificity required to pass 
constitutional muster is informed by the subject of the 
statute. If a statute is so nonspecific as to create 
uncertainty regarding the exercise of a constitutionally 
protected right, such as a woman's right to abortion, a 
higher degree of clarity is required. See Colautti v. Franklin, 
439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979), overruled in part on other 
grounds, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 
490 (1989); see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982) (evaluating 
a civil statute for vagueness and stating that "perhaps the 
most important factor affecting the clarity that the 
Constitution demands of a law is whether it threatens to 
inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights"). 
Indeed, in Colautti, the Supreme Court struck down 
provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, 
stressing the ambiguous nature of both the viability 
determination portion of the statute as well as the standard 
of care provision. See Colautti, 439 U.S. at 401. The Court 
held that the statute was impermissibly vague because 
liability was conditioned "on confusing and ambiguous 
criteria" which "present[ed] serious problems of notice, 
discriminatory application, and [a] chilling effect on the 
exercise of constitutional rights." Id. at 394.4 
 
In addition, two basic tenets of statutory construction are 
relevant to our analysis. Statutes are to be accorded a 
presumption of constitutionality and, under both state and 
federal canons of statutory construction, a statute may be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We note that the Court found the statute to be vague on its face 
without mention of First Amendment concerns. See Colautti, 439 U.S. at 
390. This in and of itself disposes of the Legislature's contention that 
plaintiffs cannot bring a facial challenge on vagueness grounds in a case 
such as this unless the First Amendment is implicated. 
 
                                12 
  
narrowed in order to fall within the confines of the 
Constitution but only if, an "if " which is important here, it 
is "readily susceptible" to such a limiting construction. See 
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 884 
(1997) ("[i]n considering a facial challenge, this Court may 
impose a limiting construction on a statute only if it is 
`readily susceptible' to such a construction"); Hamilton 
Amusement Ctr. v. Verniero, 156 N.J. 254, 280, 716 A.2d 
1137, 1149 (1998) (holding that New Jersey statute must 
be construed "in a constitutional manner if it is reasonably 
susceptible to such a construction"), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 
1021 (1999). We may not, however, "rewrite a state law to 
conform it to constitutional requirements." Virginia v. 
American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988). 
 
The Act seeks to prevent physicians from performing 
"partial-birth abortions." In medical parlance, as we have 
noted above, that term does not exist. The subject of the 
ban, then, must be determined from the text of the Act. See 
Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1033 (W.D. Ky. 
1998) (noting that in examining Kentucky's partial birth 
abortion statute, "the Court must consider the 
constitutionality of the group of words, selected and 
arranged by the General Assembly, presumably intended to 
ban whatever they encompass."). According to the Act, a 
partial-birth abortion is "an abortion in which the person 
performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a living 
human fetus before killing the fetus and completing the 
delivery." N.J.S.A. S 2A:65A-6(e). The Act thereafter 
purports to define "vaginally delivers a living human fetus 
before killing the fetus" as "deliberately and intentionally 
delivering into the vagina a living fetus, or a substantial 
portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure 
the physician or other health care professional knows will 
kill the fetus, and the subsequent killing of the human 
fetus." N.J.S.A. S 2A:65A-6(f). Discerning the meaning of all 
of this is a Herculean task and one which illustrates that 
the statutory definition of partial birth abortion is so vague 
as to encompass almost all forms of abortion. 
 
First, the term "partially vaginally delivers" could 
reasonably describe the delivery of an intact fetus partially 
into the vaginal canal or the delivery of a fetal part into the 
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vaginal canal. All abortion procedures, save the 
hysterotomy and hysterectomy which are typically not 
vaginal deliveries, could, therefore, be encompassed within 
this definition because during each of the procedures a 
fetus may be partially delivered into the vaginal canal and 
thereafter killed. For instance, during suction curettage, 
when the fetus is suctioned out of the uterus and through 
the cervix and vaginal canal, a portion of the fetus may 
remain in the uterus, effectuating a partial vaginal delivery. 
In addition, during a D&E, parts of the fetus are pulled out 
of the uterus and disarticulated, again effectuating a partial 
vaginal delivery. Finally, during an induction, the fetus may 
become entangled in the umbilical cord or the head may 
become lodged in the internal cervical os resulting in the 
fetus being partially in the uterus and partially in the 
vaginal canal when the umbilical cord is cut or the head is 
collapsed. See Little Rock Family Planning Services, P.A. v. 
Jegley, 192 F.3d 794, 798 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that use 
of term "partially" in Arkansas partial birth abortion statute 
means that "[a] physician who, as part of a D&E procedure, 
or as part of a suction-curettage procedure, brings an arm 
or a leg or some other part of a living fetus out of the 
uterus into the vagina will violate the Act"). 
 
Contrary to the Legislature's protestations, following the 
phrase "partially vaginally delivers" with"a living human 
fetus" does not narrow the reach of the Act. All experts in 
this case agree that the term "living" simply means that the 
fetus has a heartbeat, a far cry, indeed, from much of the 
rhetoric surrounding the partial birth abortion debate as to 
what "living" means in the context of partial birth abortion 
statutes. It is undisputed that a fetus has a heartbeat from 
as early as seven weeks lmp until birth, thus encompassing 
the time period during which almost all abortions are 
performed. In addition, both an intact and a disarticulated 
fetus may have heartbeats and, therefore, be "living." The 
record amply supports the District Court's finding that 
during a suction curettage, a D&E, or an induction 
procedure, the fetus may very well have a heartbeat while 
part of the fetus is delivered into the vaginal canal and part 
remains in the uterus. 
 
Moreover, far from clarifying anything, use of the term 
"living human fetus" adds to the Act's constitutional 
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uncertainty because it does not draw the line at viability, as 
the Supreme Court has done. In Roe, the Supreme Court 
stressed that the state's interest in potential life may reach 
the "compelling" point at viability, or when the fetus is 
"potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit 
with artificial aid." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160, 163 
(1973). Thus, prior to viability, the state may not interfere 
with the physician's decision, in consultation with his or 
her patient, that the pregnancy should be terminated. See 
id. at 163. After viability, however, the state may proscribe 
abortions altogether except when necessary to protect the 
life or health of the mother. See id. at 163-64. Although the 
Court in Casey subsequently adopted an undue burden 
approach when evaluating abortion regulations, it explicitly 
reaffirmed Roe's emphasis on viability, holding that before 
viability the state "may not prohibit any woman from 
making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy[,]" 
while post-viability abortion may be proscribed so long as 
there are exceptions for the life and health of the woman. 
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey , 505 
U.S. 833, 878-79 (1992). 
 
A fetus typically reaches viability after about twenty-four 
weeks of pregnancy. See Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 492 
n.4. Here, however, because a fetus may be "living" as early 
as seven weeks lmp, use of the term "living" instead of 
"viable" indicates that, contrary to the understanding of a 
large segment of the public and the concomitant rhetoric, 
the Act is in no way limited to late-term, or even mid-term, 
abortions. Rather, the Act is limited only to procedures 
which entail vaginally delivering part of a fetus from the 
uterus after the fetus is "living," or, in other words, after 
seven weeks lmp. As we have already noted, most common 
abortion procedures will fall within this limitation when 
they entail the partial delivery into the vaginal canal of a 
fetus that still has a heartbeat, as they usually do. 
 
The uncertainty of the Act is further compounded by the 
term "substantial portion." See Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 
F.3d 1142, 1150 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding the "crucial 
problem" with Nebraska's partial birth abortion statute to 
be the undefined term "substantial portion"), cert. granted 
in part, 120 S. Ct. 865, 68 U.S.L.W. 3338, 68 U.S.L.W. 
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3449 (Jan. 14, 2000) (No. 99-830). The Act prohibits 
vaginally delivering "a living fetus or a substantial portion 
thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure the 
physician . . . knows will kill the fetus, and the subsequent 
killing of the fetus." N.J.S.A. S 2A:65A-6(f) (emphasis 
added). Questions immediately arise as to whether 
"substantial portion" is measured in terms of size or volume 
in relation to the remainder of the body, length of the body, 
functionality, or a combination of these factors. Even if 
"substantial portion" were only interpreted to mean size, 
reasonable minds may well differ as to how much of a fetus 
is substantial: two limbs, four limbs, at least half of its 
body, all but the head? Indeed, the Legislature's own 
witness, Dr. Bowes, testified that "substantial" may be 
evaluated in terms of function, length, and relative size and 
there could be differences of opinion between reasonable 
physicians as to whether a portion of a fetus is 
"substantial." App. at 1138. It is constitutionally 
impermissible to force a physician to guess at the meaning 
of this inherently vague term and risk losing his or her 
professional license and receiving a heavy fine if he or she 
guesses wrong.5 
 
Indeed, the phrase "substantial portion" undermines the 
Legislature's assertion that the ban only prohibits the 
delivery of intact fetuses. Nowhere does the term"intact" 
appear in the Act and the record supports the conclusion 
that a "substantial portion" of a living fetus could well refer 
to a portion of a disarticulated fetus. Even reading the word 
"intact" into the Act, however, does not limit it to the D&X 
procedure because an intact fetus may be delivered during 
both an induction and a D&E procedure as well. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Not only are physicians bereft of notice as to what procedures are 
prohibited by the Act but the vagueness of the Act increases the risk of 
disparate enforcement. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, ___, 
119 S. Ct. 1849, 1859 (1999) (stating that vague statutes authorize and 
may even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement); 
Graynard, 408 U.S. at 108 (same). The utter lack of clarity as to the 
scope of the Act raises the Due Process concern that the New Jersey 
Board of Medical Examiners would have virtually unfettered discretion to 
revoke licenses and impose fines. 
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The Legislature argues, however, that the Act's scienter 
requirement at least partially cures the vagueness concerns 
it candidly admits exist. The Act forbids a physician from 
"deliberately and intentionally delivering into the vagina a 
living fetus, or a substantial portion thereof, for the 
purpose of performing a procedure the physician . . . knows 
will kill the fetus." N.J.S.A. S 2A:65A-6(f) (emphasis added). 
While a scienter requirement can cure a vague statute, or 
at least ameliorate the vagueness, see Colautti , 439 U.S. at 
395, it cannot do so here. At a minimum, to limit the scope 
of a statute to "deliberately and intentionally" performing a 
certain procedure, the procedure itself must be identified or 
readily susceptible of identification. See, e.g., Rhode Island 
Med'l Soc'y v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp. 2d 288, 311-12 
(D.R.I. 1999) (holding that scienter requirement could not 
save Rhode Island's partial birth abortion statute because 
the "scienter requirement modifies a vague term"). Here, it 
is not. 
 
Finally, the Legislature asserts that the reach of the Act 
is narrowed by its requirement that after the living fetus, or 
a substantial portion, is partially delivered into the vagina, 
the physician must intentionally perform a separate 
"procedure" which he or she knows will kill the fetus, and 
does so. This requirement narrows the Act, the Legislature 
asserts, to encompass only the D&X procedure in which the 
intact fetus -- again, that word "intact"-- is partially 
delivered into the vagina and a separate procedure is then 
intentionally performed whereby the fetal head is punctured 
and the intracranial contents suctioned, killing the fetus 
before delivery is completed. Because delivery is not halted 
to perform a separate procedure aimed at killing the fetus 
during a D&E, suction curettage or induction abortion 
(absent a complication), the Legislature argues that those 
abortion procedures are not prohibited by the Act. 
 
The words of the Act simply do not support any such 
reading. Nowhere does the Act require that the abortion be 
halted while a separate procedure is performed to kill the 
fetus; indeed, the word "separate" does not even appear in 
the Act. The Act simply prohibits "deliberately and 
intentionally delivering into the vagina a living fetus, or a 
substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a 
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procedure the physician . . . knows will kill the fetus . . . ." 
N.J.S.A. S 2A:65A-6(f). All abortions seek to terminate 
pregnancy and necessarily entail the intent to deliver a 
fetus, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of 
killing the fetus. 
 
Even if we were to read the word "separate" into the Act 
and find the Act only applicable to abortion procedures 
which entail the intentional delivery into the vagina of a 
fetus for the purpose of performing a "separate" procedure 
aimed at killing the fetus, however, the Act is still not 
limited to the D&X. It is uncontested, for example, that 
during a D&E, a substantial portion of the fetus may be 
intentionally and deliberately delivered into the vagina for 
the purpose of performing a procedure, such as 
dismemberment, which the physician knows will kill the 
fetus. Indeed, Dr. Wallace testified that when performing a 
D&E, his "goal" is to bring a part of the fetus down through 
the cervix because he "[does not] want to disarticulate 
whatever [he] has grabbed within the contents of the 
uterine cavity" and will only disarticulate it in the uterus if 
necessary. App. at 680. The purpose of this, he testified, is 
to avoid unnecessary passes into the uterus. See id. Also 
during a D&E, after a substantial portion of the fetus is 
delivered, the physician might be required to collapse the 
fetal skull in order to deliver the remainder of the fetus, a 
procedure he or she knows will kill the fetus. Finally, 
during an induction the physician may intentionally deliver 
the fetus into the vagina for the purpose of performing a 
separate procedure which will kill the fetus, such as cutting 
the umbilical cord or collapsing the skull to deliver the 
remainder of the fetus intact. 
 
Another difficulty is that, even though treated as separate 
procedures, the D&E and the D&X substantially overlap 
given that the D&X is essentially a subset of the D&E. 
Generally, the only difference between the procedures is 
that the fetus is usually disarticulated in the D&E, while 
intact removal is the goal of the D&X.6  In an attempt to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The record reflects that there can be benefits in attempting to remove 
an intact, rather than a disarticulated, fetus during an abortion 
procedure, including aiding in the diagnosis of fetal abnormalities. 
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perform a D&E, however, it is entirely possible that the 
physician may extract not simply a portion of the fetus but 
an intact fetus, thus transforming the procedure into a 
D&X. In addition, during both the D&E and the D&X, the 
head of the fetus may become lodged in the cervix, 
requiring the physician to collapse the head. Thus, the 
conduct of a physician during both procedures may be 
identical. Because there is no meaningful difference 
between the forbidden D&X procedure and the permissible 
and concededly constitutionally protected D&E procedure, 
and no reason of conviction or philosophy to prohibit the 
former and permit the latter, one must wonder if the true 
purpose of the Act is not, pure and simple, to dramatize to 
the public the ugly nature of abortions of all types and 
deter physicians from performing them. 
 
Be that as it may, the Legislature asserts that the 
scienter requirement narrows the application of the Act to 
physicians who intend at the outset to perform a D&X, not 
to physicians who intend at the outset to perform a D&E 
which inadvertently becomes a D&X when the fetus is 
extracted intact instead of disarticulated. So that the intent 
is clear, the Legislature proposes that physicians 
performing abortions register with the State the particular 
type of abortion which, at least at the outset, they intend to 
perform. 
 
Separate and apart from the fact, and fact it be, that no 
one would ever voluntarily register with the State that he or 
she intends to perform a procedure which could or would 
cost the physician his or her professional license, the Act 
does not support any such reading. It does not prohibit 
intentionally performing a D&X, but prohibits only the 
intentional delivery of a living fetus, or substantial portion 
thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that will 
kill the fetus and subsequent killing of the fetus. As we 
have explained, this prohibition could encompass a D&E, in 
which a physician intends to partially deliver a living fetus 
into the vagina, dismembers the fetus in the vagina, 
thereby killing the fetus, and completes delivery. See 
Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Miller , 195 F.3d 
386, 389 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that scienter requirement 
could not save Iowa's partial birth abortion ban because it 
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could still encompass the D&E procedure); Jegley , 192 F.3d 
at 798 (rejecting argument that scienter requirement limits 
scope of Arkansas partial birth abortion statute to cover 
only D&X procedure); Carhart, 192 F.3d at 1150 (applying 
similar reasoning with reference to Nebraska partial birth 
abortion statute). 
 
Finally, the Legislature argues that because New Jersey 
is one of the most "liberal" states in terms of abortion 
rights, it is "clear" that the drafters did not intend to 
repudiate decades of abortion rights by banning all 
abortions, but only intended the Act to prohibit the D&X 
procedure. The District Court, the Legislature continues, 
should have read the Act narrowly in order to effectuate 
this clear intent. Indeed, when the Attorney General would 
not defend the Act (a fact, we note, which has not escaped 
our attention but on which we choose not to comment), the 
Legislature itself appeared to do so and to declare both its 
intent and its request for a narrowing construction. 
 
Despite the Legislature's protestations, it was not the role 
of the District Court, nor is it our role, to rewrite statutes 
even at the request of the Legislature. Nonetheless, because 
there is virtually no legislative history surrounding the 
enactment of the Act, and because the Legislature in its 
submissions to us did not even attempt to suggest what 
that narrowing construction could or should be, at oral 
argument we pressed counsel for the Legislature to specify 
the narrow construction which was supposedly intended by 
the drafters of the Act and which it calls upon us now to 
put in place. We received no answer, giving us no reason to 
believe that there is an answer. Indeed, all that we have 
been told, and then at but one point in the Legislature's 
brief, is that the Act only sought to ban a new method of 
abortion which 
 
       involves the feet-first delivery of a live, intact fetus 
       almost completely out of the mother's womb, to the 
       point where only the head remains in the womb and 
       the legs and lower trunk are actually outside the 
       mother's body. At this point, the delivery is halted, the 
       baby's skull is punctured with a scissors, and the 
       baby's brains are sucked out with a vacuum, which 
       collapses the skull. 
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Appellant Br. at 6-7. 
 
It is shocking in the extreme that, whatever one may 
think of abortion in general and "partial birth abortion" in 
particular, this wholesale mischaracterization of what is 
necessarily involved in the D&X procedure and, thus, what 
the Act supposedly proscribes is what has unquestionably, 
at least in large part, inflamed public opinion. This, of 
course, is the result of "partial birth abortion" having no 
clear definition and, thus, no clear meaning. 
 
But mischaracterization aside, the words of the Act could 
not be more divergent from the Legislature's description of 
what it purported to ban. The Act nowhere specifies that 
the fetus must be intact, that it be delivered feet-first, that 
only the head remain in the womb when delivery is halted, 
that the legs and the lower trunk be outside the mother's 
body, that the skull be punctured with a scissors, or that 
the brains be sucked out with a vacuum in order to 
collapse the skull. Instead, the Act is filled with vagaries 
such as "partially vaginally delivers," "substantial portion," 
and "a procedure the physician . . . knows will kill the 
fetus." 
 
If the Legislature intended to ban only the D&X 
procedure, it could easily have manifested that intent either 
by specifically naming that procedure or by setting forth the 
medical definition of D&X utilized by the ACOG, namely: 
"(1) deliberate dilation of the cervix, usually over a sequence 
of days; (2) instrumental conversion of the fetus to a 
footling breech; (3) breech extraction of the body excepting 
the head; and (4) partial evacuation of the intracranial 
contents of a living fetus to effect vaginal delivery of a dead 
but otherwise intact fetus." App. at 1328. We render no 
opinion as to whether a statute explicitly prohibiting the 
performance of a D&X or containing the ACOG definition 
would pass constitutional muster. Cf. Women's Med'l Prof 'l 
Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 190 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(enjoining Ohio statute specifically prohibiting performance 
of "a dilation and extraction procedure upon a pregnant 
woman" because definition of procedure set forth in the 
statute encompasses D&E procedure), cert. denied , 523 
U.S. 1036 (1998); Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Doyle, 162 
F.3d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1998) (commenting that "[t]he 
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singling out of the D&X procedure for anathematization 
seems arbitrary to the point of irrationality"). We note only 
that naming the procedure or utilizing clear medical 
terminology to define that procedure for the physicians at 
whom the Act is aimed would at least have indicated the 
Legislature's supposed intent to simply ban the D&X. 
 
There is simply no excuse for the failure of the 
Legislature to have done so or for the incurably vague Act 
which resulted from that failure. Indeed, we, as was the 
District Court, are left to wonder whether the drafters chose 
a path of deliberate ambiguity, coupled with public outrage 
based largely on misinformation, in an attempt to proscribe 
legitimate abortion practices. Cf. Eubanks, 28 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1036 (in striking down a partial birth abortion statute, 
the Court noted that "[t]he legislature focused directly on 
protected activity in a manner which everyone knew might 
be unconstitutional. The legislature could have passed a 
statute of more limited reach and still achieve its supposed 
objective. Instead, it decided to go farther. Indeed, as is 
sometimes the case in controversial issues, the legislature 
seems to have striven for, in Justice Frankfurter's words, a 
`purposeful ambiguity.' ") (citation omitted). 
 
The Act, pure and simple, is not susceptible much less 
"readily susceptible" to a narrowing construction. To 
narrow it to prohibit only the D&X procedure, as the 
Legislature now says was the sole procedure it intended to 
ban, would entail a complete rewriting, if not "brute force." 
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, we decline to use such brute 
force in an attempt to save the Act, and reject out of hand 
that Court's observation that "courts do it all the time." 
Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 865 (7th Cir. 1999) (en 
banc), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Jan. 14, 2000) (Nos. 99- 
1152, 1156). As the dissent in Hope Clinic so aptly stated, 
it would be an act of "judicial hubris" to narrow the statute 
to the D&X when the drafters of the statute decided not to 
use that term, "preferring a vaguer term intended to be 
broader."7 Id. at 866 (Posner, C.J., dissenting); see also 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Numerous courts throughout the country have stuck down similarly 
worded statutes after finding them unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., 
Rhode Island Med'l Soc'y v. Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp. 2d 288, 310-12 
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Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d at 1150 (striking down 
Nebraska's partial birth abortion statute and noting that 
while court must give statute a construction that avoids 
constitutional doubts, it "cannot, however, twist the words 
of the law and give them a meaning that they cannot 
reasonably bear"). 
 
2. The Act Creates an Undue Burden 
 
In addition to finding the Act void for vagueness, a 
finding with which we wholeheartedly agree, the District 
Court determined that, under Roe and Casey, the Act 
unduly burdened a woman's constitutional right to obtain 
an abortion because: (1) the language of the Act is so broad 
that it covers many conventional methods of abortion; (2) 
the Act contains no health exception, constraining the 
physician from performing a procedure which, in his or her 
discretion, would preserve the health of the woman; and (3) 
the Act's exception for the life of the woman is inadequate. 
The Legislature contends that the District Court erred 
because Roe and Casey do not apply, and, even if they do, 
the Act creates no undue burden. We will address only the 
first ground found by the District Court, and we do so 
because the reasons which support that ground so closely 
track the reasons which compelled our conclusion that the 
Act is void for vagueness. 
 
A woman has a constitutional right under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to choose to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
(D.R.I. 1999) (holding partial birth abortion statute to be 
unconstitutionally vague); Richmond Med'l Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 55 
F. Supp. 2d 441, 493-500 (E.D. Va. 1999) (same); Causeway Med'l Suite 
v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604, 615-19 (E.D. La. 1999) (same); Evans v. 
Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1304-11 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (same); see also 
Women's Med'l Prof 'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(finding statute explicitly prohibiting the dilation and extraction method 
of abortion to be impermissibly vague because it covered D&E procedure 
as well), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998); but see Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 
195 F.3d 857, 869 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting vagueness challenges to 
Illinois and Wisconsin partial birth abortion statutes but recommending 
that the district court enter "precautionary injunctions" prohibiting the 
statutes from applying to D&E or induction abortions), petition for cert. 
filed (U.S. Jan. 14, 2000) (No. 99-1152). 
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terminate her pregnancy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
153 (1973). While affirming the essential holding in Roe 
that a state may not prohibit a woman from choosing to 
terminate her pregnancy prior to viability, the Supreme 
Court subsequently rejected the rigidity of Roe 's trimester 
framework. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992). Instead, the Casey Court 
determined that before viability, the state may regulate 
abortion but only insofar as it does not create an undue 
burden on a woman's ability to choose to have an abortion. 
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (stating that "[o]nly where a 
state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's 
ability to make this decision does the power of the State 
reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause"). In evaluating state regulations, the Court 
explained that "[a]n undue burden exists, and therefore a 
provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place 
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion before the fetus attains viability." Id. at 878. 
Although the state may freely regulate, and even proscribe, 
abortion after viability, any such restriction must still 
contain an exception "where it is necessary, in appropriate 
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health 
of the mother." Id. at 879 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65). 
 
Before examining whether the Act creates an undue 
burden, and finding that it surely does, we will briefly 
address the Legislature's threshold argument that Roe and 
Casey do not apply to New Jersey's "partial-birth abortion" 
statute because: (1) the applicable test is that enunciated in 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), and 
plaintiffs' facial challenge fails to meet Salerno's 
requirement that no set of circumstances exists under 
which the Act would be valid; and (2) "partial-birth 
abortion" is not a Casey-protected abortion procedure, but 
rather is tantamount to infanticide. We join numerous 
other courts in rejecting both arguments. 
 
First, citing Salerno, the Legislature asserts that in order 
to mount a facial challenge to an Act, plaintiffs must 
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which 
the Act would be valid. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745. 
According to the Legislature, plaintiffs cannot meet this 
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burden because, as narrowly construed -- assuming it 
could be narrowly construed -- the Act is constitutional as 
applied to them given that they do not perform the D&X 
procedure. 
 
But as several courts, including our own, have noted, the 
Casey Court muted the Salerno requirement in the abortion 
context by stating that a statute regulating abortion is 
facially invalid if "in a large fraction of the cases in which 
[the statute] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial 
obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion." 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 895. On remand to this Court, we 
immediately recognized that the Supreme Court set a"new 
standard for facial challenges to pre--viability abortion 
laws" by requiring only that "a plaintiff show an abortion 
regulation would be an undue burden `in a large fraction of 
the cases.' " Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. 
Casey, 14 F.3d 848, 863 n.21 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Casey, 
505 U.S. at 895, and noting that Salerno was the "old 
rule"). Numerous courts have recognized the substitution of 
the Casey standard for the Salerno test. See, e.g., Women's 
Med'l Prof 'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 194-97 (6th 
Cir. 1997) (stating that "[a]lthough Casey does not 
expressly purport to overrule Salerno, in effect it does"), 
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 
102 F.3d 1112, 1116 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that Supreme 
Court did not apply Salerno in Casey and that "the proper 
test after Casey is the `undue burden' standard applied by 
the Court in that case"), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1274 (1997); 
Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 
1452, 1456-58 (8th Cir. 1995)("We choose to follow what 
[Casey] actually did -- rather than what it failed to say -- 
and apply the undue-burden test. It is true that the Court 
did not expressly reject Salerno's application in abortion 
cases, but it is equally true that the Court did not apply 
Salerno in Casey."), cert. denied , 517 U.S. 1174 (1996); but 
see Causeway Med'l Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1102- 
04 (5th Cir.) (finding it "ill-advised" to assume that the 
Supreme Court abandoned Salerno in Casey  but 
invalidating statute under either standard), cert. denied, 
522 U.S. 943 (1997). 
 
Thus, in order to mount a facial challenge to an abortion 
regulation, a plaintiff need not establish that no set of 
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circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. 
Rather, a plaintiff must show that an abortion regulation 
would be an undue burden in a large fraction of the cases 
in which that regulation is relevant. 
 
Second, the Legislature contends that Roe and Casey are 
inapplicable because they apply only to aborting the 
"unborn," while the Act attempts to prohibit"the deliberate 
killing of a living human being who has almost completed 
the process of birth." Appellant Br. at 45. Because, the 
argument goes, the Act pertains to fetuses that are in the 
process of being "born" and that are more outside than 
inside the uterus when they expire, the procedure is more 
akin to infanticide than abortion. Indeed, the Legislature 
stresses, the Supreme Court in Roe deliberately left open 
the possibility of protecting "partially born" human beings 
when it declined to review a Texas statutory provision 
criminalizing "destroy[ing] the vitality or life in a child in a 
state of being born and before actual birth." Roe, 410 U.S. 
at 118 n.1. 
 
The Legislature's argument that Roe and Casey are 
inapplicable to "partial-birth" abortion procedures because 
such procedures are infanticide rather than abortion is 
based on semantic machinations, irrational line-drawing, 
and an obvious attempt to inflame public opinion instead of 
logic or medical evidence. Positing an "unborn" versus 
"partially born" distinction, the Legislature would have us 
accept, and the public believe, that during a "partial-birth 
abortion" the fetus is in the process of being"born" at the 
time of its demise. It is not. A woman seeking an abortion 
is plainly not seeking to give birth. 
 
Moreover, that the life of the fetus is terminated when a 
"substantial portion" has passed through the cervix and is 
in the vaginal canal, does not without more transform an 
abortion procedure into infanticide. Again, the medical 
evidence clearly indicates that in many conventional 
abortion procedures the fetus may be killed, i.e. the heart 
ceases beating, when a substantial portion of the fetus 
(whether it be disarticulated limbs or part of the body of the 
fetus) is in the vagina and a portion remains in the uterus. 
In what can only be described as a desperate attempt to 
circumvent over twenty-five years of abortion 
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jurisprudence, the Legislature would draw a line based 
upon the location in the woman's body where the fetus 
expires. Establishing the cervix as the demarcation line 
between abortion and infanticide is nonsensical on its face 
as well as inaccurate because that line may be crossed in 
any number of abortion procedures which the Legislature 
concedes are constitutionally protected. While there are 
unquestionably numerous ethical, philosophical, and moral 
issues surrounding abortion, we are unpersuaded that 
these issues -- or our legal analysis -- should turn on 
where in the woman's body the fetus expires during an 
abortion. 
 
Finally, the Legislature's reliance on the fact that the 
Supreme Court in Roe did not review a provision of the 
Texas Penal Code entitled "Destroying unborn child" is 
misplaced. In Roe, the Supreme Court noted in a footnote 
that numerous provisions of the Texas Penal Code, 
including the above mentioned provision, were not 
challenged by the parties. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 118 n.1. 
The fact that the Supreme Court did not sua sponte review 
a provision no party asked it to review says nothing about 
its position on that provision or on this issue. 
 
In any event, the Legislature neglected to cite the 
remainder of the Texas statutory provision which clearly 
illustrates its inapplicability to the situation at hand. In 
full, that provision states that: 
 
       Whoever shall during parturition of the mother destroy 
       the vitality or life of a child in a state of being born and 
       before actual birth, which child would otherwise have 
       been born alive, shall be confined in the penitentiary 
       for life or for not less than five years. 
 
Roe, 410 U.S. at 118 n.1 (quoting Article 1195 of Chapter 
9 of Title 15 of the Texas Penal Code)(emphasis added). By 
its own terms, then, the Texas provision applies explicitly to 
killing the fetus during parturition, or during the process of 
giving birth, not during an abortion procedure. 
Furthermore, the provision applies only where the child 
would otherwise be born alive. Absolutely nothing in the 
Act before us restricts its application to circumstances 
where the child would otherwise be born alive. 
 
                                27 
  
Quite simply, the one thing that is clear about the Act is 
that the drafters sought to restrict abortion. The Act 
explicitly states that " `partial-birth abortion' means an 
abortion" encompassing the conduct specified in the Act. 
N.J.S.A. S 2A:65A-6(e). Indeed, if the abortion procedure the 
Legislature now tells us it purported to ban were 
tantamount to infanticide, it would have been criminalized 
in the Act itself or in State homicide statutes, and the 
women upon whom this procedure is performed would not 
have been immunized from liability. The Legislature's 
attempt to label the Act a birth, instead of an abortion, 
regulation is nothing more than an effort to cloud the 
issues and avoid clear precedent. As an abortion regulation, 
the Act is subject to the analytical framework of Roe and 
Casey. 
 
Applying the principles of Roe and Casey , it is clear that 
the Act is unconstitutional because it creates an undue 
burden on a woman's right to obtain an abortion. As Casey 
teaches, an abortion regulation creates an undue burden, 
and hence is invalid, "if its purpose or effect is to place a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion before the fetus attains viability." Casey, 505 U.S. 
at 878. The Act erects a substantial obstacle because, as 
already discussed in great detail, it is so vague as to be 
easily construed to ban even the safest, most common and 
readily available conventional pre- and post-viability 
abortion procedures. Separate and apart from whether 
such a widespread proscription was intended by the 
drafters, because physicians are unable to determine 
precisely what the Act bans, they will be chilled from 
performing suction and curettage, D&E and induction 
abortions in order to avoid the risk of license revocation 
and fines. The Court has long recognized that ambiguous 
meanings cause citizens to " `steer far wider of the unlawful 
zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were 
clearly marked." Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) 
(citation omitted). Indeed, Drs. Weiss, Wallace, and Holmes 
testified that they would "stop performing all abortions" if 
the Act were to go into effect because they were unsure of 
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what conduct would fall within its confines. See Verniero, 
41 F. Supp. 2d at 499.8 
 
And if physicians who continued to perform abortions 
were to take steps to avoid the reach of the Act by, for 
example, killing the fetus by insertion of a toxic substance 
into the uterus or limiting their practices to hysterectomies 
and hysterotomies, the attendant health risks to women 
would significantly increase. Dr. Weiss testified that 
injecting a toxic substance such as digitalis or a high 
concentration of potassium into the heart of the fetus to 
ensure its demise before it is removed from the womb is 
usually not done because of the increased health risks to 
the woman. See App. at 484. Such a procedure requires 
injecting a sizeable needle either through the cervix and 
into the uterus or through the abdomen into the uterus. In 
addition, because the fetus is relatively small and 
oftentimes shifting, it is difficult, even with the aid of 
ultrasound, to inject the substance into the heart of the 
fetus. Such a procedure "increase[s] the chance of 
damaging the woman, increase[s] the risk of infection and 
even potentially increase[s] the risk of inducing or 
instill[ing] toxic substances into her." Id. Moreover, as the 
District Court found, injection of a toxic substance carries 
the risk of hemorrhage and is contraindicated for women 
who are obese. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 500. 
 
Performing a D&E by disarticulating the fetus while it is 
completely within the uterus and then waiting for the 
heartbeat to cease in order to avoid the tentacles of the Act 
would also increase the health risk to the woman by 
increasing the length of the procedure. Moreover, as Dr. 
Weiss testified, "[t]he last thing [a doctor] would like to do 
is disarticulate an advanced fetus and leave it in the uterus 
because that would run the risk of causing additional 
damage to the woman [due to sharp edges of bone 
potentially perforating the uterus]." Id.  at 486. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. And, of course, were physicians in New Jersey to stop performing 
these methods of abortion, women would be forced to go elsewhere to 
obtain procedures to which they are constitutionally entitled. Not only 
would this interfere with a woman's right to privacy and her relationship 
with her doctor, but it could create a wholly unnecessary risk to the 
woman's health or life due to delay. 
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Finally, aside from the sheer absurdity of performing only 
hysterotomies and hysterectomies in order to avoid the Act, 
those procedures carry an enhanced risk of morbidity and 
mortality to the woman due to the incidence of hemorrhage. 
See Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 485. In addition, a 
hysterectomy renders the woman sterile. Absent an 
independent reason such as cervical cancer to perform 
these procedures, they are, therefore, rarely used as 
abortion techniques. 
 
The increased risk of injury or death to the woman by 
attempting to ensure fetal demise in utero, or sterilization in 
the case of hysterectomies, clearly constitutes an undue 
burden. Indeed, the District Court found -- afinding 
certainly not clearly erroneous -- that the D&X may be a 
relatively safer second trimester procedure because it 
involves fewer entries into the uterus, thereby creating 
fewer risks of cervical laceration and uterine perforation. 
See Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 485. 
 
In sum, the Act's chilling effect on a woman's ability to 
obtain a conventional and constitutionally permissible 
method of abortion, coupled with the attendant health 
risks, creates an undue burden under Casey and, thus, 
renders the Act unconstitutional.9 In so finding, we need 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Our conclusion is consistent with those of numerous other courts 
which have struck down similarly worded partial birth abortion statutes 
because they created an undue burden. See, e.g. , Little Rock Family 
Planning Services v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794, 798 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding 
Arkansas's partial birth abortion statute unconstitutional because it 
created an undue burden by encompassing D&E and suction curettage 
procedures); Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142, 1151 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(holding Nebraska's partial birth abortion statute to be unconstitutional 
because it prohibited most common second trimester abortions, thereby 
creating undue burden), cert. granted in part , 120 S. Ct. 865, 68 
U.S.L.W. 3338, 68 U.S.L.W. 3449 (Jan. 14, 2000) (No. 99-830); Planned 
Parenthood of Greater Iowa v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386, 388 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(holding Iowa's partial birth abortion statute unconstitutional because it 
banned D&E, and in some circumstances suction curettage, abortions, 
thereby creating an undue burden); Richmond Med'l Center for Women v. 
Gilmore, 55 F. Supp. 2d 441, 487 (E.D. Va. 1999) (concluding that 
Virginia's partial birth abortion ban created undue burden because it 
prohibited D&E abortions); Eubanks v. Stengel , 28 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 
 
                                30 
  
not and, thus, do not discuss the Act's lack of a health 
exception or whether its life exception is adequate. 
 
B. Standing, Ripeness and Abstention 
 
Having determined what the Legislature describes as the 
"central issue in this case" -- the scope of the Act -- we 
turn our attention to three of the issues which, the 
Legislature argues, themselves turn on that determination: 
standing, ripeness and abstention. The Legislature 
contends that plaintiffs do not have standing to raise their 
constitutional challenges, that the matter is not ripe for 
review, and that the District Court should have abstained 
from evaluating a state statute before it has been 




The Legislature contends that plaintiffs lack standing 
because they do not, by their own admission, perform the 
D&X procedure, the only method which the Legislature now 
posits is banned by the Act. Therefore, according to the 
Legislature, plaintiffs would not sustain any injury were the 
Act to be enforced. 
 
The District Court found that plaintiffs had standing to 
challenge the Act because the Act encompasses the 
conventional methods of abortion plaintiffs currently 
perform and, thus, they would be exposed to civil liability 
and license revocation. In addition, the District Court 
stressed well-established precedent for the proposition that 
abortion providers have third party standing to assert the 
rights of their patients in the face of governmental intrusion 
into the abortion decision in order to determine whether 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1035 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (finding Kentucky partial birth abortion ban 
created undue burden because it prohibited D&E procedure); see also 
Women's Med'l Prof 'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that statute explicitly prohibiting D&X procedure created undue 
burden), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036 (1998); but see Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 
195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding no undue burden in partial birth 
abortion statute, but only after limiting statute to cover only D&X 
procedure), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Jan. 14, 2000)(Nos. 99-1152, 
1156). 
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such interference would constitute an undue burden. We 
exercise plenary review over the District Court's 
determination. See Conte Bros. Automotive, Inc. v. Quaker 
State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 224 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
In order to meet the constitutional requirements of 
standing which emanate from Article III of the Constitution, 
plaintiffs were required to allege and ultimately prove that: 
(1) they have suffered or imminently will suffer an"injury in 
fact"; (2) the injury is "fairly traceable" to the defendant's 
conduct; and (3) the requested relief is likely to redress the 
injury. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't , 523 U.S. 83, 
103 (1998); see also Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the 
Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 
508 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1993). 
 
As we have already discussed in much detail, the Act is 
so vague as to be impervious to a readily susceptible 
narrowing construction, effectuating a ban on the 
conventional types of abortions currently performed by 
plaintiffs. Given that the Act is not subject to a narrowing 
construction, it occasions an imminent "injury in fact" 
upon plaintiffs because, as written, it threatens them with 
severe civil penalties, namely, license revocation and a 
$25,000 fine.10 In addition, plaintiffs have satisfied the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The District Court found Planned Parenthood had standing for 
essentially the same reasons as the plaintiff physicians, i.e. that it 
provides constitutionally protected abortions which may be disallowed by 
the broad and vague Act, subjecting it to license revocation. The 
Legislature asserts that Planned Parenthood does not have standing 
because no evidence was introduced at the hearing concerning the 
abortions allegedly performed at Planned Parenthood. See Appellants' Br. 
at 37 n.18; Reply Br. at 15 n.17. Plaintiffs point to the declaration 
submitted to the District Court in support of the motion for preliminary 
restraints certifying that Planned Parenthood is a licensed ambulatory 
health care facility which performs abortions. See Appellees' Br. at 55 
n.28. We need not address this argument, buried within and argued 
exclusively in footnotes, because it is uncontested that the plaintiff 
physicians perform abortions and, therefore, at least they have standing 
to assert the claims. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton , 410 U.S. 179, 189 (1973) 
(declining to decide whether additional appellants have standing because 
"the issues are sufficiently and adequately presented by" appellants with 
standing). 
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second and third prongs of the standing inquiry: the harm 
is more than "fairly traceable" to the State's enforcement of 
the Act, and the requested relief, a permanent injunction, 
will clearly redress the injury. 
 
Moreover, the District Court correctly concluded that 
plaintiffs had standing to bring an undue burden challenge 
on behalf of their patients whose abortion rights were 
allegedly unconstitutionally impinged. Pointing to the close 
relationship between a physician and his or her patients, 
privacy interests, and imminent mootness concerns, the 
Supreme Court explicitly held that "it generally is 
appropriate to allow a physician to assert the rights of 
women patients as against governmental interference with 
the abortion decision[.]" Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 
118 (1976). Indeed, in Casey, where, it should be 
remembered, the Court first articulated the undue burden 
standard, the challenge to state abortion restrictions was 
brought by abortion clinics and physicians who performed 
abortions on behalf of their patients. See Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). 
 




The Legislature next argues that the challenge to the Act, 
filed the day the Act was to have become effective and 
before the Act had been interpreted by the state courts or 
enforcement agencies, was not ripe for review. Moreover, 
the Legislature argues, as it did with regard to standing, 
that if construed narrowly, the Act does not cover the 
procedures that plaintiffs perform and, thus, there is no 
danger that it will be enforced against them. The District 
Court rejected these arguments and found the matters ripe 
for review. Again, we agree. 
 
Intertwined with Article III's requirement that a party 
suffer injury or be in danger of imminent injury, is the 
ripeness doctrine which seeks to "prevent the courts, 
through the avoidance of premature adjudication, from 
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements." Artway 
v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1246-47 (3d Cir. 
1996) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 
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(1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 
U.S. 99, 105 (1977)). To determine whether a claim is ripe, 
a court must weigh: "(1) the hardship to the parties of 
withholding court consideration; and (2) the fitness of the 
issues for judicial review." Id. at 1247. 
 
Federal court review is not foreclosed merely because 
there is a pre-enforcement challenge to a state statute. 
Indeed, in both Casey and Colautti, the Supreme Court 
entertained constitutional challenges to state abortion 
statutes which were filed before the statutes took effect. 
See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 845; Colautti v. Franklin, 439 
U.S. 379, 383 (1979), overruled in part on other grounds, 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
This matter was ripe for review because there would have 
been hardship to the parties had review been withheld and 
the issues were fit for review. With reference to the latter, 
a comprehensive factual record was amply developed 
during a four-day hearing, allowing the District Court to 
fully delineate the legal issues. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 
1249 (noting that the "principal consideration" in deciding 
whether the issue is fit for review is "whether the record is 
factually adequate to enable the court to make the 
necessary legal determinations"). 
 
With reference to the hardship to the parties of 
withholding review component of the ripeness test, and as 
discussed with reference to standing, even though the 
plaintiffs do not perform the D&X procedure, the threat 
that the Act would have been enforced against plaintiffs 
was credible and not speculative. As in the criminal 
context, "[w]hen the plaintiff has alleged an intention to 
engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a 
constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and 
there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder, he 
`should not be required to await and undergo a criminal 
prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.' " Babbitt v. 
United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) 
(citation omitted). Similarly, plaintiffs have performed in the 
past, and intend to perform in the future, concededly 
constitutionally protected procedures such as the D&E. The 
Act fairly easily can be read to prohibit those 
constitutionally protected procedures, and plaintiffs 
 
                                34 
  
received no assurances that it would not be enforced 
against them if they performed such procedures. They were 
entitled to know what they could not do. Cf. Virginia v. 
American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988) 
(stating that it was "not troubled" by pre-enforcement 
challenge to state statute because "[t]he State has not 
suggested that the newly enacted law will not be enforced" 
and "plaintiffs have alleged an actual and well-founded fear 
that the law will be enforced against them"). 
 
The District Court did not err in finding the challenge to 




The Legislature argues that the District Court should 
have but did not abstain pursuant to Railroad Comm'n of 
Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Essentially, the 
argument goes, the District Court should not have 
undertaken to analyze the Act under the United States 
Constitution because the Act has not yet been interpreted 
by the New Jersey courts. According to the Legislature, 
interpretation of the Act by the state courts, the courts 
empowered to render binding interpretations of state 
statutes, could significantly narrow the scope of the Act, 
thereby eliminating, or at least limiting, the scope of the 
federal constitutional concerns raised here. While on its 
face the Act may seem ambiguous, the Legislature 
continues, New Jersey courts frequently perform"judicial 
surgery" to narrowly interpret statutes to relieve 
constitutional concerns. The doctrine of Pullman  
abstention, the Legislature concludes, dictates that the 
state courts be given the opportunity to do just that before 
a federal court swoops in and strikes down a statute. 
 
The District Court carefully considered whether it should 
abstain under Pullman and concluded that abstention was 
not warranted because the Act was so vague that it was not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The Legislature's contention that the matter is not ripe for review 
because a federal court should not attempt to decipher a state statute 
without the benefit of interpretation by the state courts is better framed 
as an argument for abstention and will be addressed in our discussion 
of abstention. 
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susceptible to a state court interpretation which would 
render unnecessary, or substantially limit, the federal 
constitutional question. See Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 
488-90. Yet once again, we agree. 
 
The obligation of a federal court to adjudicate claims 
which fall within its jurisdiction has been deemed by the 
Supreme Court to be "virtually unflagging." New Orleans 
Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans , 491 U.S. 
350, 359 (1989) (citations omitted). It has long been said 
that "[federal courts] have no more right to decline the 
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that 
which is not given. The one or the other would be treason 
to the Constitution." Id. at 358 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 
6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821)). This is because "Congress, and 
not the Judiciary, defines the scope of federal jurisdiction 
within the constitutionally permissible bounds." Id. at 359. 
 
Abstention is an "extraordinary and narrow exception to 
the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy 
properly before it" and one which should be invoked "only 
in the exceptional circumstances." Colorado River Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 
(1976) (citation omitted); see also City of Houston v. Hill, 
482 U.S. 451, 467 (1987) (stating that "[a]bstention is, of 
course, the exception and not the rule"); Marks v. Stinson, 
19 F.3d 873, 881 (3d Cir. 1994) (same); City of Pittsburgh, 
757 F.2d at 45 (same). 
 
One type of abstention, commonly referred to as Pullman 
abstention, applies "in cases presenting a federal 
constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented in 
a different posture by a state court determination of 
pertinent state law." Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814 
(citation omitted). In other words, abstention under Pullman 
"is appropriate where an unconstrued state statute is 
susceptible of a construction by the state judiciary`which 
might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for federal 
constitutional adjudication, or at least materially change 
the nature of the problem.' " Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 
147 (1976) (citation omitted). The purpose of abstaining is 
twofold: (1) to avoid a premature constitutional adjudication 
which could ultimately be displaced by a state court 
adjudication of state law; and (2) to avoid "needless friction 
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with state policies." Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500. While these 
are compelling considerations, we reiterate that Pullman 
abstention should be rarely invoked. See Artway , 81 F.3d 
at 1270 (recognizing that Pullman abstention is an 
"exception to the general rule that federal courts must hear 
cases properly brought within their jurisdiction"). 
 
Before a federal court may abstain under Pullman , three 
"exceptional circumstances" must be present. First, there 
must be "uncertain issues of state law underlying the 
federal constitutional claims." Presbytery of N.J. of the 
Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Whitman, 99 F.3d 101, 
106 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155 (1997). 
Second, the state law issues must be amenable to a state 
court interpretation which could "obviate the need to 
adjudicate or substantially narrow the scope of the federal 
constitutional claim." Id. Third, it must be that "an 
erroneous construction of state law by the federal court 
would disrupt important state policies." Id.  If all three 
circumstances are present, the District Court is then 
required to determine, in the Court's discretion,"whether 
abstention is appropriate by weighing such factors as the 
availability of an adequate state remedy, the length of time 
the litigation has been pending, and the impact of delay on 
the litigants." Artway, 81 F.3d at 1270. 
 
We agree with the District Court that, even though the 
state courts have not had the opportunity to interpret the 
Act, all of the "exceptional circumstances" requisite for 
Pullman abstention are simply not present. Arguably 
inherent in plaintiffs' vagueness challenge to the Act is that 
there is an uncertain question of state law, namely, what 
procedures are covered by the Act. The Supreme Court has 
explicitly held, however, that "not every vagueness 
challenge to an uninterpreted state statute or regulation 
constitutes a proper case for abstention." Procunier v. 
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 401 (1974), overruled on other 
grounds, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). In any 
event, we need not reach the first and third "exceptional 
circumstances" because it is clear that the second 
circumstance is not present in this case. 
 
At the risk of redundancy, the Act is so vague that it is 
not amenable to a state court interpretation which would 
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render unnecessary or substantially narrow the 
constitutional question at issue. Cf. Colautti , 439 U.S. at 
392 n.9 (refusing to abstain from deciding vagueness 
challenge to abortion regulation because of "the extent of 
the vagueness that afflicts [the statute]"). We have 
previously noted a leading commentator's observation that 
the Supreme Court's "amenability" standard establishes a 
"fairly high threshold requiring a `substantial possibility' 
that a state interpretation would obviate the need for a 
federal constitutional decision." Artway, 81 F.3d at 1271 
n.34 (citing to Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 
692-93 (1994)). "If the statute is not obviously susceptible 
of a limiting construction, then even if the statute has 
`never [been] interpreted by a state tribunal . . . it is the 
duty of the federal court to exercise its properly invoked 
jurisdiction.' " Hill, 482 U.S. at 468 (quoting Harman v. 
Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 535 (1965)). 
 
Abstaining to allow the New Jersey state courts to 
interpret the Act would be fruitless because those courts, 
even applying "judicial surgery," are not empowered to 
completely rewrite statutes. See Hamilton Amusement Ctr., 
156 N.J. at 280 (holding that New Jersey courts may use 
" `judicial surgery' to excise a constitutional defect" but the 
statute must be "reasonably susceptible to such a 
construction"). For the same reasons that we will not 
rewrite the Act, we have every confidence that the New 
Jersey courts would likewise refuse to do so and would 
likely say that it is up to the Legislature to take the Act 
back and do it over. 
 
Given how vast the reach of the Act and how vague and 
ambiguous its terms, the entire Act is permeated with 
defects of constitutional dimension, defects "judicial 
surgery" could not cure without a total rewrite. There is, in 
other words, nothing to "excise" but the Act itself. As we 
have discussed throughout this opinion, and it bears 
repetition one last time, the Act could reasonably be 
interpreted to prohibit most conventional abortion 
procedures. As such, it provides little guidance to 
physicians who are attempting to tailor their conduct to 
avoid the Act's prohibitions, performance of which could 
strip them of their professional licenses. No narrowing 
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construction has even been suggested by the Legislature, 
aside from its conclusory assertion that the Act covers only 
the D&X procedure, an assertion completely unsupported 
by the Act itself. Moreover, given the numerous meanings 
that could be attributed to the Act's terms, as well as the 
inherent uncertainty of terms such as "substantial portion," 
the Act is simply not susceptible to, much less, readily 
susceptible to, a limiting reading by any court, much less 
a reading which would bring it within the confines of the 
Constitution. Because the Act cannot be reasonably 
interpreted to obviate or substantially narrow the federal 
constitutional question, the second exceptional 
circumstance required for Pullman abstention is lacking. 
 
Not only are all of the requisite exceptional circumstances 
absent, but equitable considerations, such as the effect of 
delay on the litigants or the public interest, also weigh 
against abstention. Cf. Chez Sez III Corp. v. Township of 
Union, 945 F.2d 628, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1991) ("When a facial 
challenge is involved, abstention is generally not 
appropriate because `extensive adjudications, under a 
variety of factual situations, [would be required to bring the 
statute] within the bounds of permissible constitutional 
certainty[.]' ") (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378 
(1964)), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 907 (1992). Unsure of what 
conduct the statute encompasses, physicians would cease 
performing conventional abortions such as D&Es for fear of 
running afoul of the Act. Thus, if the federal court were to 
abstain while cases brought under the Act wend their way 
through the state courts, the rights of women to obtain 
constitutionally protected abortions would be chilled. 
Moreover, such limitations on the abortion procedures 
available to women could have dramatic and irreversible 
health risks to pregnant women. See, e.g., Verniero, 41 F. 
Supp. 2d at 502 (detailing health risks attendant to women 
forced to carry pregnancies to term such as liver or kidney 
disease, severe hypertension, cardiac conditions, diabetes, 
blindness or self-harm due to exacerbated schizophrenia). 
 
The Supreme Court's discussion in Baggett is 
illuminating. In Baggett, state employees challenged a 
Washington statute requiring loyalty oaths as being 
unconstitutionally vague. See Baggett v. Bullitt , 377 U.S. 
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360, 361 (1964). The District Court abstained and 
dismissed the case, holding that adjudication was 
inappropriate in the absence of a state court interpretation 
of the statute as state court interpretation might resolve the 
constitutional issues. See id. at 366. The Supreme Court 
reversed. It pointed out that, unlike in other cases in which 
vagueness was a concern, the Baggett plaintiffs "cannot 
understand the required promise, cannot define the range 
of activities in which they might engage in the future, and 
do not want to foreswear doing all that is literally or 
arguably within the purview of the vague terms." Id. at 378. 
As such, the Court opined, "[i]t is fictional to believe that 
anything less than extensive adjudications, under the 
impact of a variety of factual situations, would bring the 
oath within the bounds of permissible constitutional 
certainty." Id. Abstention, it concluded,"does not require 
this." Id. 
 
Likewise, in this case, physicians cannot understand 
what conduct is permissible or prohibited under the Act. 
Because the Act is subject to multiple interpretations and 
can encompass numerous procedures, extensive 
adjudication in the state courts would be necessary to 
clarify the Act and narrow its scope even assuming, with 
little or no confidence, that that could be done at all. In the 
meantime, physicians would drastically limit their abortions 
practices to avoid the reach of the Act and a woman's 
constitutional right to obtain an abortion would be 
impermissibly chilled. See Hill, 482 U.S. at 467-68 (noting 
that "to force the plaintiff who has commenced a federal 
action to suffer the delay of state-court proceedings might 
itself effect the impermissible chilling of the very 
constitutional right he seeks to protect") (quoting Zwickler 
v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252 (1967)). The District Court did 
not abuse its discretion when it refused to abstain. 12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. On November 19, 1999, the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted 
Rule 2:12A permitting the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to 
certify questions of state law to the Supreme Court of New Jersey. Rule 
2:12A became effective on January 3, 2000. See Notice to the Bar: Rule 
Adopted on Certification of Questions of Law, 8 N.J. Lawyer 2560 (Dec. 
6, 1999). While the Legislature brought this rule to the attention of the 
Court in a letter submitted pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j), it did not 
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specifically request that this Court utilize the rule, nor did it set 
forth 
proposed questions for certification or argue why certification would be 
appropriate in this case. 
 
In any event, certification would be fruitless in light of the multiple 
problems which permeate the Act. As the Supreme Court in Hill opined 
when the possibility of certification was raised,"[a] federal court may 
not 
properly ask a state court if it would care in effect to rewrite a 
statute." 
Id. at 471. 
 
13. Given this disposition, we need not reach plaintiffs' arguments that 
the Act discriminates against women in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause and that the Act does not serve a legitimate state interest. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court.13 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 
 
I do not join Judge Barry's opinion, which was never 
necessary and is now obsolete. That opinion fails to discuss 
the one authority that dictates the result in this appeal, 
namely, the Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg v. 
Carhart, 2000 WL 825889 (U.S. June 28, 2000). Our 
responsibility as a lower court is to follow and apply 
controlling Supreme Court precedent. I write briefly to 
explain why Carhart requires us to affirm the decision of 
the District Court in this case. This is an appeal by the New 
Jersey State Legislature from a decision of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey holding 
the New Jersey Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997, 
2A:65A-5 et seq., unconstitutional and permanently 
enjoining enforcement of the Act. Planned Parenthood of 
Central New Jersey v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2nd 478 
(D.N.J. 1998). The New Jersey statute closely resembles 
statutes enacted in recent years in many other states. 
 
On January 14, 2000, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to review the decision in Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 
F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S.Ct. 865 
(2000), which presented the question of the 
constitutionality of a similar Nebraska statute. The 
Supreme Court recently held that the Nebraska statute is 
unconstitutional. Stenberg v. Carhart, 2000 WL 825889 
(U.S. June 28, 2000). 
 
The Court based its decision on two grounds. First, in 
Part II-A of its opinion, the Court held that the Nebraska 
law is unconstitutional because it lacks an exception for 
the preservation of the health of the mother. See 2000 WL 
825889, *9-*14. Second, in Part II-B of its opinion, the 
Court held that the Nebraska statute is unconstitutional 
because it imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability 
to choose the method most commonly used for second 
trimester abortions, the "dilation and evacuation" (D & E) 
method. See 2000 WL 825889, *14-*18. 
 
Under Carhart, the decision of the District Court must be 
affirmed. First, the New Jersey statute, like its Nebraska 
counterpart, lacks an exception for the preservation of the 
health of the mother. Without such an exception, the New 
Jersey statute is irreconcilable with Part II-A of Carhart. 
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Second, the Supreme Court's holding in Part II-B of 
Carhart is also applicable here. As noted, in that portion of 
its opinion, the Court held that the Nebraska statute 
applied, not only to the "dilation and extraction" or D & X 
procedure, but also to the more commonly used D & E 
procedure. The wording of the relevant provisions of the 
Nebraska statute is nearly identical to that of the New 
Jersey statute. Thus, the Supreme Court's holding in Part 
II-B of its opinion in Carhart must be regarded as 
controlling in this case. 
 
In light of this interpretation of the New Jersey statute, 
the Legislature's argument that the plaintiffs lack standing 
must fail. As noted above, the New Jersey statute must be 
interpreted, in light of Carhart, as applying to the D & E 
procedure, and the plaintiff physicians in this case perform 
that form of abortion. The Legislature's argument that this 
case is not ripe because the New Jersey statute has not 
been authoritatively interpreted by the state courts or state 
enforcement officials must also fail. In view of the 
interpretation in Carhart, there is no reason to wait for 
interpretation by state officials or judges. 
 
In a post-Carhart filing, the New Jersey Legislature has 
urged us to certify questions concerning the interpretation 
of the New Jersey statute to the state supreme court. In 
Carhart, however, the Supreme Court of the United States 
turned down a similar request for certification by the 
Attorney General of Nebraska. 2000 WL 825889, *18. The 
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States to deny 
certification in Carhart must be regarded as controlling 
here, both with respect to the Legislature's request for 
certification and with respect to its closely related argument 
that the District Court erred in refusing to abstain 
pursuant to Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co. , 312 U.S. 
496 (1941). 
 
In conclusion, Carhart compels affirmance of the decision 
of the District Court. 
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